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This is UNEVALUATED
Information

1. The 12 August 1955 session of the GDR Volkskammer was a heavy blow to all reactionary elements in the GDR, including Nuschke, and this was the intended effect of the session. The speech made by Grotewohl on this occasion was in complete agreement with the Soviet line of policy. According to SED leaders, it was absolutely necessary that the preconditions for negotiations between West Germany and the USSR be pointed out. The Soviets did not want to do the job themselves and so they delegated the task to Grotewohl. Nuschke's opposition against the speech does not necessarily prove that he is a reactionary; but it is clear that he had become rather old and that he does not understand much of the tactics of a "dialectic foreign policy". Dieckmann also opposed the line taken by Grotewohl. He only spoke in the Volkskammer because he feared that he might be pushed into the background by Dr. Loch, his No. 1 enemy. In the meantime, Pushkin has succeeded in pacifying Nuschke, who again cherishes the hope of being kept in reserve for important missions. Nuschke may, however, be mistaken in this hope.
2. It does not matter that wide elements of the East German people, including the working population, do not particularly like the whole proceedings of the Volkskammer on 12 August. The session of the Volkskammer was carefully planned and designed to make clear the fundamental attitude of the East toward the question of the German reunification. The Western and Eastern concepts clash with each other in this matter. The West would like to incorporate a reunified Germany at least as far as the Oder-Neisse line into NATO. In order to reach this goal, the West will be ready to make some concessions in the field of security. Bonn probably sincerely believes that such a solution is also desired by the majority of the East German people.
3. The Western concept faces an entirely different Soviet concept which is fully shared by the SED. The Soviet stand is more flexible than the Western attitude because it leaves open the following three possibilities:
 - a. West Germany remains within NATO and will be subject to certain limitations in her armament. This does not rule out the establishment of an all-European security system. The GDR, which will also be subject to a restriction of her armament, will adhere to the Warsaw Pact. Within the framework of this solution, both West and East Germany would be recognized as sovereign states. This solution would offer most favorable economic possibilities for West Germany and would on the other hand also

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secure the continuity of political and social developments in the GDR. The cold-war tactics would have to be abandoned while the East still had possibilities of infiltrating West Germany through the DGB, and SPD and through strikes.

- b. Germany will be rearmed and neutralized, and both West Germany and East Germany will withdraw from their present systems of alliances. The ideological affiliations of West and East Germany will not be affected, however, by such a solution. Such a solution would be tolerable to the SED regime, because it offers security to the GDR and makes West Germany less immune to Eastern propaganda.
 - c. Germany will be reunified to a certain extent. An all-German government will be established, but guarantees will be taken that the economic and social status of the GDR will remain unchanged. Such a solution would be the closest approach to a reunification, but it involves a certain danger for the GDR, because West Germany would do everything to prove the superiority of her economy over that of the GDR.
4. The future development will depend on Dr. Adenauer's attitude and the outcome of the Moscow talks. The general political trends are, however, clear. They are:
- a. The USSR desires a general relaxation of international tensions, and this desire is shared by the Western powers.
 - b. The USSR does not want to pay for this relaxation of tensions with major concessions. For prestige reasons, the USSR cannot abandon the GDR without betraying the cause of Socialism.
 - c. The USSR knows that the reunification of Germany will only be a question of secondary importance to the Western powers, but that these powers want to exploit the military potential of West Germany. The USSR does not fear West Germany, and she will therefore ultimately accept the present status of West Germany if another solution cannot be obtained. The USSR is aware of the fact that major forces in West Germany are only little interested in the German reunification and put the political and economic rehabilitation of Germany uppermost. The USSR is ready to exploit these trends.
 - d. The USSR firmly hopes that the building of Socialism will make better progress in the GDR and that work for Socialist education will be more effective.

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